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Finding Voice for Victims of Crime in the 
Adversarial Criminal Justice System 
 
Abstract— Adversarial criminal justice system is designed to 
accommodate only two parties, the prosecution and the 
defendant, in the combative atmosphere of its trial process. 
The victim has no right of audience other than as witness for 
the prosecution. The involvement of victims as active 
participants in the exclusionary adversarial criminal justice 
system continue to attract debates among scholars. Whereas 
some favour the involvement because of its cathartic value 
for victims others oppose it on ground of the dislocation this 
might bring to the system and the threat to the defendants’ 
rights. Although, there have been significant victim reforms 
in some advanced jurisdictions creating some forms of rights 
for the victim, the rights remain unenforceable internally of 
the criminal justice process but externally of it through some 
administrative mechanisms.  This paper reviews the position 
of some of the scholars on the foregoing, the various models 
of the system that have been constructed by scholars to 
accommodate victims and the emerging rights for victims. 
The position of this paper is that for the rights so far created 
for victims of crime to be truly beneficial, the so-called rights 
should be enforceable internally of the system with the 
necessary safeguards for the existing rights of offenders.  
Keywords- Adversarial criminal justice system; victims of 
crime; model; participation; rights; enforcement  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Adversarial criminal justice system accommodates 
only two parties, the state and the offender who engage 
each other in the combative atmosphere of a formal 
courtroom. In this model of criminal procedure, every 
offender had to be processed according to a written law. It 
is an offence for any community members to assume a 
judicial position to try a criminal offence.1 Crime is viewed 
under this model as a breach of certain normative values of 
society as a whole and consequently, such infractions can 
only be redressed in the interest of the entire society rather 
than in the interest of an individual or a group of 
individuals who are the direct victims of such infraction. In 
particular, the accused is sentenced to a term of 
                                                          
1 This was the position in the Nigerian case, Garba v University of 
Maiduguri [1986] 1 NSCC 245; [1986] 2 SC 128. 
imprisonment without any compensation to the victim 
(Ibidapo-Obe, 2005, p. 122). As a general proposition it 
can be said that the guiding principle under the adversarial 
model of criminal justice is the punishment of the offender 
(ibid).  
However, in many places the pendulum is swinging 
back towards redress for victims of crime (Beloof, 1999, p. 
289). Whereas some jurisdictions2 have made tremendous 
progress in this direction by implementing several victim-
oriented policies, others3 still hold tenaciously to the 
traditional model. Although victims do not yet have the 
locus standi to complain to a court that any of their so-
called rights has been infringed by an agency of criminal 
justice in these jurisdiction, studies have shown that the 
victims now feel their injuries are recognised by the system 
to a certain extent, even though much of the progress may 
be symbolic (Booth et al, 2011, p. 390). 
This paper does a review of substantial literature on 
the involvement of victims of crime in the adversarial 
criminal justice before bringing out the gap in literature by 
pointing out some areas of concern.  
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the context of this paper the review will focus on 
the adversarial criminal justice system, the significance of 
victims in the system and the emerging rights of victims of 
crime. The review will be done in four segments: role of 
victims in the adversarial criminal justice system; model of 
victim participation; emerging rights for victims of crime; 
and gap in literature/area of concern.  
 
                                                          
2 Such as England and Wales, the United States of America,  Australia, 
New Zealand, The Netherlands, Scotland, the Republic of Ireland and 
South Africa, most of which represent  key centres for victim reform 
upon which other jurisdictions have based their own policy agendas 
(Hall, 2010, 6).  
3 Such as Nigeria and most African countries. 
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A. The role of victims  in the adversarial criminal justice 
system 
In the broader context, Sanders argues that victims 
of crime were not reckoned with in the criminal justice 
system for many years except for their evidence in court 
(Sanders, 2002, p. 200). In the same vein, Dignan et al 
state that decisions to prosecute and sentence under the 
retributive system of criminal justice are based on ‘official 
assessment of what the “public interest” demands’ (Dignan 
et al, 1996, p. 155). Other than their occasional relevance 
as prosecution witnesses, victims are treated as strangers at 
the trial of the offenders for the injuries they have caused 
them (Wright, 1996, p. 23). Criminal justice parades dual 
faces, the first of which regulates the speed of the process 
by ‘applying safeguards such as “due process” to make 
sure the innocent are not punished’, while the other hastens 
the process by ‘pushing against those safeguards so that 
they do not enable the guilty to escape’ (ibid). It seems that 
Wright’s view of criminal justice is informed by Professor 
Herbert Packer’s two models, that is, the Crime Control 
Model and the Due Process Model (Packer, 1968, p. 153). 
Though these provide the platform upon which several 
other models have evolved, neither of them places any 
significance on the victim as a focus of the criminal justice 
system.  This point will be discussed further below. 
As against the foregoing, Williams argues that as 
much as victims’ initiatives are desired in the criminal 
justice system, the changes must not conflict with the rights 
of the defendant. Without this safeguard the inclusion of 
victims’ participation in the criminal justice system may be 
counter-productive (Williams, 2005, p. 91). 
In the modern adversarial criminal justice system 
victims are liable to be subjected to secondary 
victimisation in the hands of defence lawyers during cross-
examination.  This is said to be due to ‘the systemic 
structures and values of adversarial system’ that demands 
that witnesses are treated in a particular way (Doak, 2008, 
p. 63). Sanders et al share this view and accordingly reason 
that such hostile treatment of the victims is not 
unconnected with the fact that they are not regarded as 
parties to a criminal charge (Sanders et al, 2011, p. 284).  
In the same way, Doak advocates victims’ participation at 
the trial process as this will boost the legitimacy of the 
criminal process (Doak, 2008, p. 135).  
McCarthy joins Doak when he argues that redress 
for the victim of a crime will enhance the credibility of the 
system in that victims will be assured of the recognition of 
the injuries they have suffered as a result of the acts or 
omissions of the offenders (McCarthy, 2012, p. 366). 
Indeed, it has been argued that the victims’ level of 
satisfaction is greatly determined by the level of 
participation a jurisdiction accords them (Kelly et al, 1997, 
p. 239; Erez, 2000, p. 177). In the same way, Reeves et al 
recommend certain responsibilities which may be grouped 
under compensation, protection, services, information, and 
responsibility to be undertaken by the state to ensure the 
full participation of victims in its criminal justice process 
(Reeve et al, 2000 pp. 129-130). 
The net effects of the foregoing is the emergence of 
several conflicting and reconcilable models of victim 
participation in the criminal justice process.  
B. Models of victim participation 
Herbert Packer made the most successful attempt 
to construct models of the criminal process. He calls his 
two models the ‘Due Process Model’ and the ‘Crime 
Control Model’ (Packer, 1968, p. 153). The success of 
these models set the standard for decades for scholars to 
build on (Roach, 1999, pp. 12-13). The conflicting nature 
of the two models is the source of the adversarial notion of 
the criminal justice process, in that, as much as the Crime 
Control Model tries to de-emphasise the adversarial aspect 
of the process, the Due Process Model tries to make it the 
core of it (Packer, 1968, p. 157). According to Roach: 
The essence of each of the Packer’s two models is 
captured by an evocative metaphor. The criminal 
process in the crime-control model resembles a high 
speed assembly-line conveyor belt” … operated by the 
police and prosecutors. The end product of the 
assembly-line is the guilty plea. In contrast, the due-
process model is an “’obstacle course…” in which 
defence lawyers argue before judges that the 
prosecution should be rejected because the accused’s 
rights have been violated. The assembly-line of the 
crime-control model is primarily concerned with 
efficiency, while the due-process model is concerned 
with fairness to the accused and “’quality control” 
(Roach, 1999, p. 13). 
When Packer came up with his two models of 
criminal justice in 1968 he did not contemplate that victims 
should have a say in the criminal justice process (Beloof, 
1999, p. 203; Roach, 1999, p. 19; Sanders, 2002, p. 203). 
Packer believed that the kind of model we need is one that 
explicitly describes the priorities of the criminal process. 
Thus, he asserted that although it will take more than one 
of these normative models, it will not take more than the 
two models he designed (Beloof, 1999, p. 290; Griffiths, 
1970, p. 361). 
While Packer’s assertion might have been true at the 
time, it is no longer so, because the contents of his two 
models are insufficient to accommodate victims’ 
participation (Beloof, 1999, p. 290; Sebba, 1982, p. 231). 
To put it in another way, Packer’s view of criminal justice 
does not begin to exhaust the possibilities of a third model 
(Griffiths, 1970, p. 362). According to Beloof, for there to 
be a useful victim model there would need to be ‘a 
consensus in law that the value underlying the victims’ 
roles are genuine and significant’ (Beloof, 1999, p. 291). 
He accordingly advocates a third model, which he terms 
the “Victim Participation Model” which is required as 
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complement rather than replacement for Packer’s two 
models (ibid) as a reflection of this shift in the paradigm of 
the criminal procedure. He goes further to signpost the 
three models by using them to explain the key features of 
the criminal justice system. 
However, Sanders observes that just as Packer 
presents two irreconcilable norms, so does Beloof’s ‘three 
model’ approach to understanding criminal justice in that: 
What Beloof gives us is, essentially, a list of features of 
the criminal justice system – actual and desirable. 
When some of those features conflict with others he 
gives us no basis for understanding how some are 
prioritised over others, nor how prioritisation should 
take place. Beloof takes an analytical model that sets 
out to illuminate irreconcilable value conflicts and adds 
to it a further set of irreconcilable elements (Sanders, 
2002, p. 206). 
Sanders concludes that although Beloof’s three 
model approach is ‘descriptively accurate’ it is 
‘analytically untidy’ (ibid). He argues for example, that in a 
system that requires consultation with the victim on 
whether to prosecute, the three models proposed by Beloof 
fail to state whose view is superior in the event of conflict 
between the position held by the victim and that held by the 
prosecutor (ibid). 
Griffiths considers Packer’s two models as only 
one model which he terms “the Battle Model” despite the 
fact that Packer presents them as diametrically opposed. To 
him,  
Packer consistently portrays the criminal process as a 
struggle – a stylized war – between two contending 
forces whose interests are implacably hostile: the 
Individual (particularly, the accused individual) and the 
State. His two models are nothing more than alternative 
derivations from the conception of profound and 
irreconcilable disharmony of interest (Griffiths, 1970, 
p. 367). 
Instead, Griffiths proposed what he terms the 
“Family Model” (ibid, p. 371). The family model does not 
see the offender as an enemy like Packer’s “Battle Model”; 
instead, it sees him as a person whose conduct is 
reprehensible but ought not to be condemned (ibid, pp. 
371-376). 
Sebba objects to Griffiths’ Family Model, saying 
that, quite apart from the fact that Griffiths does not 
provide detailed insight into the operation of the model, it 
does not feature the victim as a significant factor in the 
criminal justice system (Sebba, 1982, p. 234). However, he 
acknowledges that despite the inherent inadequacies in the 
model it is nevertheless consistent with his social defence-
welfare model to be discussed in the next paragraph 
because, according to him, both his social defence 
movement and Griffiths’ welfare philosophy regard the 
offender as a person who has breached the norms of the 
society rather than as an enemy of the society (ibid, pp. 
234-235). 
In order to overcome the limitations in Packer’s two 
models, Sebba proposes two models of his own, an 
“adversary-retribution” model and a “social defense-
welfare” model (ibid, p. 231). The first model advocates 
the victim’s participation at the trial and sentencing stages 
of the criminal justice process. This model upholds the 
basic structure of the `common law trial wherein there will 
be the usual confrontation between the offender and the 
victim, while at the same time there will be a determination 
of sentence which would be proportionate to the crime 
committed, in which case the injury suffered by the victim 
will be an important consideration (ibid). The “social 
defense-welfare” model on the other hand, advocates a 
critical and mediating role for the state between the parties, 
where the state strives to control threats to the society by 
means of either incapacitation or rehabilitation of the 
offender while at the same time it caters for the needs of 
the victims so that the victim-offender confrontation is 
substantially removed (ibid, pp. 231-232). 
Cavadino et al (Cavadino et al, 1997) write that the 
‘restorative justice’ movement which favours the making 
of reparation by offenders to their victims and the ‘just 
deserts’ movement which advocates proportionality 
between the seriousness of the offence and the severity of 
the punishment, are the two most significant recent trends 
in criminal justice (ibid, p. 233). They are of the view that 
the aim of the criminal justice system should be to advance 
victim satisfaction and empowerment (ibid, p. 237), within 
the parameters of proportionality as a limiting factor, in 
order to also safeguard the rights of the accused (ibid, pp. 
246-248). Although they acknowledge that there is a 
divergence of opinion on whether the twin principles of 
reparation and just deserts are compatible, they believe that 
the two principles are ‘each defensible if propounded in 
modest and limited form. In such a form they are not only 
compatible but complementary and should each have its 
place in any justifiable system of punishment’ (ibid). In 
other to achieve this, the modern criminal justice system 
should be designed in a way that it accommodates more of 
reparation than just desert (ibid). 
Cavadino et al accordingly set up five models as a 
typology of the relationship between victim-oriented 
responses to crime and the traditional retributive principle 
of criminal justice. These are: (1) the conventional model, 
(2) the victim allocution model, (3) the welfare model, (4) 
the strictly proportional composite model, and (5) the 
integrative restorative justice model (ibid, p. 234). The 
‘conventional’ model encapsulates the elements of the 
present criminal justice system which de-emphasises the 
significance of the victim and emphasises punishment of 
offenders. The ‘victim allocution’ model recognises the 
offenders’ ‘just deserts’ but gives more recognition to the 
voice of victims in the determination of the form that those 
‘just deserts’ should take (ibid, p. 235). The ‘welfare’ 
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model advocates the provision of welfare services for 
victims outside the boundaries of the criminal justice 
system (ibid). In respect of the last two models, that is, the 
‘strictly proportional composite’ model4 and the 
‘integrative restorative justice’ model5 Cavadino et al state 
that although they are not found in practice they intend to 
use them to examine to what extent the two rival principles 
of retributive and reparative/restorative justice are 
compatible  (Cavadino et al, 1997 p. 235). It should be 
noted that the previous three models clearly explain the 
context within which victim-oriented responses to crime do 
occur Dignan et al, 1996, p. 154).6 
Ashworth agrees with Cavadino et al’s preferred 
‘integrative restorative justice’ model to the extent that the 
victim’s right of participation is restricted to the issue of 
the quantum of compensation or the degree of reparation to 
expect from the offender, while the interest of the general 
public is to be the determinant factor in respect of the other 
components of sentencing (Ashworth, 2000, pp. 197-198). 
Their position not only promotes victim participation in the 
adversarial criminal justice system but also safeguards the 
interests of the offenders and those of the wider community 
(ibid, p. 198). However, Sanders sees a certain lack of 
confidence exhibited by Cavadino et al in the victim-rights 
approach they advocate ‘within the context of a (yet-to-be-
created) restorative justice based system’ even though they 
advocate the supremacy of the state in cases of conflict 
between the victim and the prosecutor over decisions to 
prosecute and quantum of punishment (Sanders, 2002, p. 
205). 
Roach identifies two new models of victims' rights, 
punitive and non-punitive. While the punitive model relies 
on criminal sanction, the non-punitive model stresses crime 
prevention and restorative justice (Roach, 1999, p. 28). He 
concludes that the non-punitive model is a true alternative 
to the punitive model of criminal justice because its crime 
control strategy is not dependent on punishment but rather 
uses the concepts of restorative justice and crime 
prevention to reconcile the interests of offenders, victims 
and their communities (ibid, p. 37). Sanders however 
doubts if due process rights for the defendants would be 
respected in such a system (Sanders, 2002, p. 205).  
I stand in-between Sebba’s “adversary-retribution” 
model and Cavadino et al ‘integrative restorative justice’ 
model. This is because, while we advocate victim 
                                                          
4 This model relates to the degree of punishment to impose on offenders 
which strictly must be commensurate to the degree of crime committed 
or injury caused. This model considers offenders’ reparation to their 
victims as unfair prejudice. 
5 This is the process of integrating restorative justice model into the 
existing criminal justice process. Reparation or restorative justice seeks 
to redress victims suffering through such measures as financial 
compensation, restitution, symbolic tributes, and apologies. 
6 The authors clearly state here the objective of their next paper which is 
now being considered, i.e. (Cavadino et al, 1997). 
participation in the criminal justice we must not lose sight 
of the rights of the offender and the overall justice of the 
case to all the affected parties, the victim, the offender and 
the society. While Sebba’s model supports victim’s 
participation at both the trial and sentencing stages of the 
criminal justice process with the focus on proportionality 
of punishment and consideration for the injury suffered by 
the victim, Cavadino et al’s model restricts victim 
participation in the criminal justice process to the issue of 
the quantum of compensation or the degree of reparation to 
expect from the offender, while the interest of the general 
public is to be the determinant factor in respect of the other 
components of sentencing (Ashworth, 2000, pp. 197-198). 
However, I will slightly modify Cavadino et al’s model to 
accommodate the interest of the victim in the determination 
of sentence even though, the ultimate decision will be left 
for the sentencing judge who, notwithstanding victim’s 
suggestion, is not to pass a sentence above what is 
prescribed for a particular offence. 
However, one thing which is common to all the 
proposed models is the generalisation of the concept of 
victims’ participation in the criminal justice process. 
Although Sanders appears to favour restorative justice and 
some inquisitorial elements for victim participation in the 
criminal justice system in his conclusion (Sanders, 2002, p. 
222), he fails to demonstrate how either or both concepts 
resolve the issue he earlier noted while critiquing Beloof’s 
model. As he states in that context: 
What we need is an approach with more explanatory 
power, one that can better explain why the criminal 
justice system has developed a range of apparently 
victim-based measures which complement existing 
features of the system yet which largely fail to achieve 
their stated purposes (Sanders, 2002, p. 206). 
C. Emerging rights for victims of crime 
There have been substantial disagreements among 
scholars as to what rights should be given to victims of 
crime in the adversarial criminal justice system. In this 
context Ashworth draws a working distinction between the 
rights of victims to services and procedural rights in the 
criminal process to set up his arguments against the use of 
victim impact statements in sentencing (Ashworth, 1993, p. 
499). According to him, the rights of victims to services 
may include a right to call upon emotional and practical 
support in the period following the offence, a right to be 
kept informed and to be treated with respect and sympathy 
by law enforcement agents during the investigation 
process, a right to be treated with respect and 
understanding before and during court proceedings, and a 
right to compensation for victims of criminal violence. His 
procedural rights for the victims include rights to be 
consulted on the decision whether or not to prosecute, on 
the bail-custody decision, on acceptance of a plea, on 
sentence, and on parole release (ibid). 
GSTF GSTF Journal of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS) Vol.4 No.2, October 2015
©The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
24
Elsewhere, he argues that victim participation should 
be limited to matters of interest to the victim rather than to 
matters of public interest (Ashworth, 2000, p 200). 
However, the formalistic distinction between service and 
procedural rights made by Ashworth fails to recognise the 
interconnection between the two (Sanders et al, 2010, p. 
741). Besides, Ashworth presents no approach to resolving 
the conflicts he identifies between the rights of the 
defendant and those of the victim, which in consequence 
premises his position on a zero sum game whereby 
affording rights to victims inevitably translates to a 
restriction of the defendants’ rights (Hall, 2010, p. 142).  
Hall is then of the view that the ground for asking for 
the procedural rights should not solely be based on “the 
wishes” of the victims but much more on the critical 
objectives and the sole purpose of the criminal process as a 
legal and social institution (Hall, ‘The relationship between 
victims and prosecutors…’, 2010, p. 34). Therefore, Hall 
recently proposes a triangular model of victim-
centeredness for the modern adversarial criminal justice. 
The three planks on which Hall’s model stands are 
practical centrality, narrative centrality and cultural 
centrality (Hall, 2012, p. 191). The practical centrality 
means that the criminal justice should be systematically 
organised bearing in mind the practical concerns of the 
victims. The practical centrality will include standard 
service rights such as the right to information which may 
be accorded through booklets, help desk, signposting etc., 
and physical facilities such as provisions of waiting rooms, 
seating and cafeteria etc. The cultural centrality relates to 
changes in the occupational cultures of criminal justice 
practitioners and staff which Hall believes might affect the 
practical changes advocated for victim-centred trials unless 
these occupational cultures are changed. The narrative 
centrality states that a victim-centred trial is that which 
would allow room for freer construction of victims’ 
narratives. It will therefore address the practice of 
interruption, compelling victims to give evidence in an 
unfamiliar and unnatural manner such as pre-recorded 
evidence and curtailing victim’s narratives through closed 
questions or even open-ended question framed in a way to 
elicit narrow answers etc. (ibid, p. 203).  He therefore 
advocates that victims’ rights should be enforceable within 
the system and this can be done by giving party status to 
victims so that whatever grievances they have concerning 
their rights could be dealt with immediately during trials by 
the bench as opposed to external, lengthy and bureaucratic 
complaint mechanism put in place in England and Wales 
for victims to air their grievances (ibid, p. 210). 
D. Areas of concern 
It will be clear from the foregoing that victims’ 
rights have received much recognition in recent years. 
However, concerns about the enforceability of those rights 
still remain unresolved. In reviewing the issue from a 
theoretical perspective, Hall had earlier expressed concerns 
that despite the emergence of victims’ rights and policy 
recognition of those rights none of the theories canvassed 
by scholars directly address how the rights of the victims 
can be enforced in any given jurisdiction (Hall, 2010, p. 
142). Although, he later came up with a triangular model of 
victim-centeredness for the modern adversarial criminal 
justice whereby victim rights can be enforced internally of 
the criminal justice system (Hall, ‘The relationship 
between victims and prosecutors…’, 2010, pp. 191, 210), 
the practicality of this remains unclear in a system where 
victim does not have party status as the offender. 
It will also be clear that the foregoing scholars have 
identified critical areas of attention for victims in the 
criminal justice system. Several modes of treatment for the 
victims of crime have been proposed and criticised. What 
is common to most of the modes however, is that they do 
not recognise the peculiarities of certain situations and 
circumstances which may differ from one society to 
another due to the interplay of several variables which 
include education, economy, cultural and religious values 
of the people. 
It is also of serious concern in spite of the several 
rights that are now available to victims of crime in many 
national and international instruments, victims remain 
strangers in the adversarial criminal justice. They cannot 
assert any of the rights internally of the system as the 
offenders.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
The adversarial criminal justice process has thus 
come under intense criticisms in recent times. This is 
because many see it as a process which has for too long 
shut its doors to one of the important parties to criminal 
disputes, and one which creates, cares and protects the 
rights of the assailant in utter disregard for the rights of the 
assailed. Victims’ confidence and participation in the 
modern adversarial criminal justice wanes by the day. The 
rights created for victims in the system are tangential as 
they are presently constituted. In consequence of this, 
victims continue to be at the mercies of the criminal justice 
providers who dictate the scope of their rights and the 
much that the victims could get from them. For the rights 
to be meaningful and beneficial, they should be enforceable 
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